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Decker: At-Will Employment: A Proposal for its Statutory Regulation

AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR ITS
STATUTORY REGULATION
Kurt H. Decker*
INTRODUCTION

In the 1960's, vast strides were instituted at the federal' and state 2
levels to eliminate employment discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and handicap. Today there is a corollary

interest in broadening protections for employee job interests. This is in
part attributable to a slowing economy,3 high interest rates, 4 and exces5
sive unemployment.

Recently, courts and legislatures have created certain exceptions to
the traditional at-will employment relationship. 6 At-will employment
allows termination by either an employee or employer for no cause at
all. 7 Despite widespread criticism, 8 many jurisdictions still remain faithful to this concept.

*B.A., Thiel College; M.P.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt University; L.L.M. (Labor), Temple University; Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pennsylvania; Member Pennsylvania Bar.
I. See infra notes 21-31.
2. See infra note 32.
3. 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) "News and Background Information" 14 (January 3, 1983).
4. 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) "News and Background Information" 127 (October 18,
1982).
5. 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) "News and Background Information" 201 (November 15,
1982).
6. See infra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §442 (1958) refers to at-will employment as
follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to
serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by
either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of
time or by supervening events.
Id.
8. It is apparent from recent commentators that at-will employment has become the labor
relations topic for the 1980's. For example, see C. BAKALY, JR. & J. FEERICK (Co-ch.), DEVELOPING RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES INTHE WORKPLACE (1981) [hereinafter cited as BAKALY, JR. &
FEERICK]; C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: FOR-
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MATION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH (1983); J. BARBASH, J. FEFRICK & J. KAUFF
(Co-ch.), UNJUST DISMISSAL AND AT WILL EMPLOYMENT (1982) [hereinafter cited as BARBASH,
FEERICK & KAUFF]; R. BERENBEIM, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS (1980); R. COULSON, THE
TERM[INATION HANDBOOK (1981); M. DICHTER & A. GROSS (eds.), THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
ISSUE (1982); F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES INLARGE NON-UNION COMPANIES (1980); A.
WESTIN, WHISTLEBLOWING, LOYALTY, AND DISSENT(1980); Abramson & Selvestri, Recognition
of a Cause ofActionfor Abusive Dischargein Maryland, 10 BALT. L. REV. 257 (1981); Baxter,
Jr. & FarrelI, ConstructiveDisfharge- When Quitting Means Getting Fired,7 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 346 (1981); Berger, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV.
153 (1981); Blades, Employment At-Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exerciseof Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Bowers & Clarke, UnfairDismissal and ManagerialPrerogative: A Study of 'Other Substantial Reason,' 10 INDUS. L.J. 34
(1981); Dedon, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The Employee At Will Relationship in
Massachysetts, 16 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 285 (1980); DeGiuseppe, Jr., Effect of the Employment At- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and FringeBenefits, 10 FORDHAM UR,
L.J. I (18 1); Enright, The Motivation Requirement in Single Employee Discharge Cases, 11
LoY. CHI. L.J. 501 (1980); Harrison, Wrongful Discharge:Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56
INDIANA L.J. 2Q7 (1981); Hochman, Determining a Standardof Causationfor Discriminatory
Discharges Under Section 8(a)(3) of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 913
(1981); Isaacson, The Worker's Reemergence as an Individual, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 189
(1981); Lewis, Employment Protection: A Preliminary Assessment of the Law of Unfair
Dismissal, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 19 (1981); Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to Sue for
Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge,6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1980); Mennemeier, Protectionfrom
Unjust Discharges:An ArbitrationScheme, 19 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MENNEMEIER]; Murg & Sharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule?, 23 B. C. L. REV. 329 (1982); Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claimsby At Will Employees: A
New Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265 (1981); Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
PECK]; St. Antoine, The Right Not to be Fire Unjustly, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ST. ANTOINE); Summers, ProtectingAll Employees Against Unjust Dismissal,58 HARV.
BUS. REV. 132 (1980); Sumimers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal. Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SUMMERS, Individual Protection];Tanis,
ContractLaw: An Alternative to Tort Law as a Basisfor Wrongful DischargeActions in Illinois,
12 Loy. CHI. L.J. 861 (1981); Van Noppen, III, Workers'Compensation- RetaliatoryDischarge
- The Legislative Response to Dockery v. Lampart Table Company, 58 N. C. L. REV. 629 (1980);
Vernon & Gray, TerminationAt Will- The Employer's Right to Fire,6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 25
(1980); Weisburst, Guidelinesfora PublicPolicy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule: The
Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981); Comment, Wrongful Discharge of
Employees Terminable At Will - A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729
(198 1); Comment, The Employment-at-Will Rule: The Development of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's Response, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 477 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The
Employment-at- Will Rule]; Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.: Tort Action for Retaliatory
Discharge Upon Filing of Workmen's Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. 659 (1979); Comment, Pierce v. Ortha PharmaceuticqlCorporation:Is the Public Policy Exception to the At
Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment Relationship 33 RUT. L. REV. 1187 (198 1);
Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.: A Remedy for the Abusively Discharged At Will
Employee, 1979 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 563 (1979); Comment, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.:
Wrongful Discharge,A New Tort to ProtectAt Will Employees, 8 WASH. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 91
(1980); Note, Job Securityfor the At Will Employee: ContractualRight of Dischargefor Cause,
57 CHI-KENT L. REV. 697 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Job Security]; Note, Limiting the
Employer's Absolute Right of Discharge:Can Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge?,29 KAN L.
REv. 267 (1981); Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Terminationof an
'At Will' Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the
Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 743 (1979); Note, Recognizing the
Employee's Interests in Continued Employment - The CaliforniaCause of Action for Unjust
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The need to protect the at-will employee, who does not possess the
bargaining power equal to that of an employer, has arrived. 9 Courts
should, at this time, avoid further modification of the at-will employment relationship. This restraint should be observed to minimize the

adverse effects that any complete abrogation might have on employment, productive efficiency, and overburdening of the judicial process

with additional cases. Time and thought should be given now to
whether an abrogation should occur through "judicial erosion" or
"legislative mandate."
This article examines the extent to which the legislature rather
than the courts should abrogate the at-will employment relationship

within an individual state. To accomplish this, the following will be
reviewed: (1) historical perspective of at-will employment; (2) erosion

of at-will employment within the United States; and (3) abolishing atwill employment through a statutory proposal.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

TraditionalView of At- Will Employment
Employee and employer rights within the United States trace their
beginnings to England's Statute of Labourers. 10 This Statute provided
that a general hiring of labor for an unfixed term was presumed to be

for a year, and a "master" could not "put away his servant" except for
reasonable cause."" 1 After its repeal, English courts continued to apply

Dismissal, 12 PAC. L. REV. 69 (1980); Note, JudicialLimitation of the Employment At- Will
Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 552 (1980); Note, Dischargeof Employee At Will Actionable
Under Public Policy Exceptions, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 557 (1981); Note, A PersonalDamage
Remedy for the Employee At Will: A Reappraisalof a Recent Proposal,22 S. D. L. REV. 431
(1977); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Implied Contract];Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will - Have the
Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Limiting the Right to Terminate]. Additionally, law firms have begun warning their clients
regarding excepting to the at-will employment relationship. See 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
"News and Background Information" 148 (February 21, 1983).
9. Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired on an at-will basis.
Another 22% are unionized and about 15% are federal or state employees. See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OFTHE UNITED STATES: 1979, at 427
(table 704) (union membership); Id. at 392 (table 644) (total labor force); Id. at 313 (table 509)
(government employees); see generally PECK, supranote 8, at 8-10; ST. ANTOINE, supra note 8,
at 34.
10. I NV.BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (1969). The Statute of Labourers was enacted
in response to the extreme labor shortage that resulted from the Black Death in the midfourteenth century.
Ii. Id. at 425-26.
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the Statute's spirit by presuming that a "general hiring" was intended to

serve as an employment contract for one year.' 2 If the employment

continued for longer than one year, it could be terminated only at the

end of an additional year.13

The American at-will employment approach has been viewed as a

departure from, and as a part of, this English heritage. Early American
courts adopted the English approach.' 4 In the 1880's, however, American law departed from this by developing its own version of at-will

employment.
In 1877, H.G. Wood's treatise on master-servant relationships
articulated what seemingly became at-will employment in America. 15
Although "Wood's Rule" has been persuasively challenged,16 it has

become the primary basis for at-will employment in this country.' 7
12. The English term "general hiring" is the equivalent of the American term "indefinite
hiring" - an employment relationship with no specific duration. Annot., Durationof Contract
of Hiring which Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per Day,
Week, Month, or Year, I1 A.L.R. 469 (1921).
13. Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (C.P. 1827).
14. P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 133 (1969). See, e.g., Adams v.
Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom v.
Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1881).
15. Wood wrote that:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve. H. WOOD,
MASTER AND SERVANT §134 (2d ed. 1886) [hereinafter cited as H. WOOD].
16. The notion that at-will employment arrangements of indefinite duration are terminable by either party, at any time, is not one that has its roots deep in the English common law.
See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. It apparently sprang from an American treatise
writer. See H. WOOD, supranote 15; see also Comment, "The Employment-at-Will Rule"supra
note 8 at 480 n. 19; Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate, supra note 8 at 205-206 nn. 22-30
and accompanying text. This treatise cited three cases that supposedly supported this, namely:
Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871);
DeBriar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870).
Wilder v. UnitedStates concerned a contract between the Army and a private businessman for
the transportation of goods. It had nothing to do with general hirings. Debriar v. Minturn
involved a controversy between a discharged bartender and his ex-employer over his right to
occupy a room in the tavern. It was essentially a case of unlawful ejection. Tatterson v. Suffolk
Mfg. Co. actually contradicts Wood's assertion. The court found no error in allowing a jury to
determine the nature of the employment contract from written and oral communications,
usages of trade, the situation of the parties, the type of employment, etc. Id. at § 136, at 283 n.5.
Commentators, however, have severely questioned the soundness of this support. See, e.g., ST.
ANTOINE, supra note 8, at 33-34; SUMMERS, Individual Protection,supra note 8, at 485; Note,
Job Security, supranote 8, at 699-700; Note, Implied Contract,supra note 8, at 341 nn. 53 & 54.
17. Annot., supranote 12, at 470; Annot., Employee's Arbitrary Dismissalas Breach of
Employment ContractTerminable At Will, 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975). See also Note, Limiting the
Right to Terminate, supranote 8 at 206 n. 30.
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American courts probably adopted "Wood's Rule" to facilitate development during the industrial revolution by promoting the prevalent
economic ideology of laissez faire and freedom of contract. 18 Within
this framework "Wood's Rule" seemed equitable. It provided the
employer the flexibility to control the workplace through the unchallengeable power to terminate at-will. In turn, the employee retained the
freedom to resign if more favorable employment presented itself, or if
working conditions became intolerable. The at-will employment relationship has even been codified in several jurisdictions 19 and referred to
20
by the United States Supreme Court.
Statutory Restrictionson the Right to Terminate At- Will
Congress and various state legislatures have prohibited, in certain
instances, the summary termination of an at-will employee. 2' The pri-

mary federal statutory schemes that limit an employer's right to terminate an at-will employee are the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA) 22 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 The LMRA
prohibits termination for exercising the right to organize and select an
employee representative. 24 Title VII prohibits any termination based

upon discrimination involving race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 25 In enforcing these statutes, courts have maintained that an
employer is free to terminate an employee for any reason except those
specifically prohibited by these statutes. 26 Other legislation restricting

the right to terminate are: (1) the Age Discrimination in Employment

18. See, e.g., SUMMERS, Individual Protection, supra, note 8, at 484-86; Comment,
ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 8, at 1824-36; Note, Job Security, supra note 8, at
700; Note, Implied Contract,supra note 8, at 342-43, 346-47.
19. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §2922 (\est Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §66-101 (1979 &
Supp. 1982).
20. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908).
21. Generally speaking, United States government employees, as well as various state and
municipal employees, may not be terminated without a hearing and, in some instances,
government employees cannot be fired except upon a showing of cause. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§7513 (Supp. IV 1980) (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). For example, the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 provides that a government agency may remove or otherwise discipline a
covered employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the Civil Service. The
statute also provides a notice period prior to adverse action and affords the employee the right
to be represented by an attorney and the right to a written decision enumerating the reasons for
the action taken. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§141-157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-1-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
24. See 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(I), 158(a)(3) (1976).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1976).
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d. Cir. 1942).
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Act of 1967,27 (2) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,28
(3) the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 29 (4) the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 30 and (5) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 31State statutes

also contain similar limitations.3 2

The principal goals of this federal and state legislation have been

to: (1) promote unionization as a countervailing force against employer

power and control; 33 (2) establish a minimum level of economic enti-

tlement for employees; 34 (3) combat discrimination against specific

groups in hiring and dismissals; 35 (4) protect employee health and

safety; 36 and (5) guarantee a minimum level of security for retirement,
and for the survivors of wage earners. 37 In addition, the "assumption of
27. 29 U.S.C. §621 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination based on age).
28. 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(1) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for
assertion of rights guaranteed under the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
29. 38 U.S.C. §§2021(a)(A)(i), 2021(a)(B), 2021(b)(1) (1976) (guaranteeing the right to
re-employment upon satisfactory completion of military service and prohibiting discharge
"without cause" within one year after re-employment).
30. 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) (1976) (prohibiting discharge of an employee for filing any
complaint or instituting any proceeding under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
31. 29 U.S.C. §794 (Supp. IV 1980) (requiring affirmative action to advance the
employment of handicapped individuals by government contractors or subcontractors).
32. See Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate, supra note 8 at 203 n. 10. For example,
state legislatures have also provided some protection for at-will employees. Several states have
statutes prohibiting discharges based upon political activity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 56, §33 (West 1975). For a collection of state laws regarding firing for political activity, see
[1982] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State.Laws) P43,045. Some states prohibit discharges because of
physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §1420(a) (West Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 149, §24K (Michie Law. Co-op 1976); MINN STAT. ANN. §363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West Supp.
1981). A few states do not permit employers to take action against employees for serving as
jurors or for indicating their availability as jurors; for example, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Michigan, North Dakota, and Vermont. For a collection of state laws regarding termination for
serving on a jury, see [1982] LAB. L. REP.(CCH) (State Laws) P43,035. Other states prohibit
termination for refusing to take a lie detector test; for example, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. For a
collection of relevant state laws, see [1982] LAB L. REP.(CCH) (State Laws) P43,055. Another
common provision in state laws is a prohibition against retaliatory termination for filing a
workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp.
1980). See also M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Ch.

3 (1966); Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation 1:
Employers, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 907 (1967).
33. See supra notes 22 and 24.
34. 26 U.S.C. §§3301-3311 (1976) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act); 29 U.S.C. §§201-219
(1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) (minimum wage and hours); see U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS (1972) (federal-state unemployment insurance system). See generally W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATION 545-639 (1974).
35. See supra notes 23, 27-29, 31.
36. See supra note 28.
37. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §2, 88 Stat.
829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.); Social Security Act, Pub. L.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol1/iss2/2

6

1983]

At- Will
Employment A Proposal for its Statutory Regulation
Decker: At-Will
Employment:

risk doctrine" as it applied to employment has been effectively repealed
38
by workers' compensation laws.
EROSION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

Perhaps the most significant recent legal development affecting
employment relations has been the modification of at-will employment
in a number of jurisdictions. 39 In the past twelve years critics have
increasingly sought to abrogate this relationship. In fact, courts and
some state legislatures have responded by developing viable exemptions
to at-will employment.
Court Action
Tort or "Abuse" Theories
The circumstances in which an employer's right to terminate have
been judicially curtailed under a tort or "abuse" theory may be divided
No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
38. See I. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§5.00-.20, at 33-39 (1978).
39. Courts in at least eighteen jurisdictions have recognized a judicially created public
policy exception to at-will employment. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,427
A.2d 385 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoko Irrigation, 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept't of Labor
Servs., 6 Kan. App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, No. 81-CA2460-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615,432
A.2d 464 (1981); Siles v. Travenal Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354,433 N.E.2d 103 (1982);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Henderson v. St. Louis
Hous. Author., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1979); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); McCullough v.
Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 817, 400 P.2d 72 (1965); Harless v. First Natl Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978).
Courts in at least nine states, including the District of Columbia, have indicated that they
might adopt the public policy exception to at-will employment under appropriate facts. Larsen
v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268
Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465,
590 P.2d 513 (1978); Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980);
Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); K.W.S. Mfg., Inc. v.
McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. Appl. 1978); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581
(1979); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Six jurisdictions have specifically rejected a judicially created public policy exception to
at-will employment. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Catania v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Goodroe v. Georgia Power
Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874
(Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293,244 S.E.2d 272, appealdenied,
295 N.C. 465,246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whitaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1981).
See also Comment, The Employment-at-Will Rule, supra note 8.
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into three categories. First, courts have been willing to permit an excep-

tion when the termination violates established public policy, especially a
"clear," statutorily declared policy. Second, an exception has
been

applied where employees have been involved in "whistle blowing"; i.e.,
the reporting by an employee of unlawful or improper conduct. Last,

courts have found an exception for "abusive" or "retaliatory" terminations; i.e., where an employee refuses to accede to improper requests or
demands.
"Public Policy" Exception
One of the most important limitations that some courts have
placed upon the termination of at-will employees is the public policy
exception. This is usually applied where employees were terminated for:
(1) refusing to violate a criminal statute; (2) exercising a statutory right;

(3) complying with a statutory duty; or (4) observing the general public
policy of the state. Specific examples of employee terminations violating some form of recognized public policy include: (1) declining to
commit perjury at the employer's behest; 40 (2) refusing to participate in
an illegal price-fixing scheme; 41 (3) serving on a jury; 42 (4) filing

workers' compensation claims; 43 (5) refusing to take a lie detector test
in a state prohibiting its forcible administration;44 (6) performing

unauthorized catheterizations; 45 (7) mislabeling packaged goods; 46 (8)

avoiding payment of commissions; 47 and (9) avoiding payment of a
pension. 48
Although the public policy exception has expanded the circum-

stances where an employee may sue an employer, it is not without
limits. Generally, the employee is required to demonstrate initially that
40. Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Petermann v. Teamsters
Local 396, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
41. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980); see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Recently, some federal courts
have permitted employees fired for refusing to participate in illegal price-fixing schemes to
maintain a private cause of action under the federal anti-trust laws. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker
Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776
(W.D. Pa. 1982); but see In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
43. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind.249,297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428
A.2d 1317 (1981); contra Martin v. Tapley, 360 So.2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Industries
Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978).
44. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
45. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978).
46. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
47. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
48. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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the termination concerns a matter of public policy. When only private
interests are involved courts are hesitant to allow recovery. For example, employees have had their claims denied when terminated for:
(1) questioning an employer's internal management system;49 (2) questioning an employer's integrity;50 (3) threatening to sue an employer for
52
51
an injury unrelated to employment; (4) taking too much sick leave;
(5) misusing the employer's Christmas funds; 53 (6) seeking to examine
54
an employer's books in the employee's status as a shareholder;
56
55
(7) attending night school; and (8) cohabiting with a co-employee.
"Whistleblowing"
Related to the public policy exception are terminations which
involve reporting of the employer's or an employee's allegedly unlawful
or improper conduct to the employer or to governmental authorities.
These are essentially instances of either: (1) protective whistleblowing;
or (2) active whistleblowing. "Protective whistleblowing" occurs when
the employee is asked to commit a crime. 57 "Active whistleblowing"
involves the employee seizing the initiative and disclosing his/her suspicions, that may or may not be well founded. Cases have recognized this
for reporting to either government or employer authorities conduct that
may violate the law, but where no statute requires an employee to
5
report. 8
"Abusive"or "Retaliatory"Termination
Here the employer tries to exploit a position of power in the
employment relationship. The employer then5 9retaliates against the
employee for refusing to accede to its demands.
Contract Theories
Express or Implied Guarantees
This exception concerns situations where employees have been
told upon hiring that they would be employed so long as they "did the

49. Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
50. Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
51. Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. App. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (1980).
52. Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
53. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977).
54. Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
55. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
56. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis.2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980).
57. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
58. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
59. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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job." 60 Statements of this nature may create indefinite term contracts.
This may occur through express agreement, oral or written, especially

where an employer personnel manual provides a policy for release of

employees "for just cause only."6 1 Personnel manuals potentially may

have a much broader application. Employer liability, however, probably can be minimized if it refrains from giving assurances or promises,

oral or written, at any time.62
Good Faith and FairDealing
Some courts have indicated that there is an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including
employment contracts. 63 This may exist where the totality of the relationship firmly establishes the indicia of an implied agreement that
gives rise to the requirement of good faith and fair dealing. Among the
factors supporting this are: (1) extraordinary length of service; (2) good
employee performance verified by routinely receiving raises, bonuses,
and promotions; (3) employer assurances that employment would con-

tinue; (4) employer practice of not terminating except for cause whether
based on an oral or written policy; and (5) no prior warning that the
employee's position was in jeopardy. 64
Legislative Action

Despite the seemingly abundant legislation on the federal and state
levels limiting the right to terminate at-will employees,65 an outright
alteration or abolition of at-will employment is yet to be achieved.
Regretfully, these piecemeal restrictions may be the result of a continued legislative acknowledgment that some vitality remains in the
at-will employment relationship.
This is not to say that legislatures have not considered statutory

regulation of at-will employment. Legislatures in Connecticut, Michi60. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Magnan v. Anaconda
Industries, Inc., 37 Conn. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
61. Id.
62. See Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F.Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Personnel
manuals and employee handbooks have been rejected as the basis for legally binding
modifications of at-will employment in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska. See Sargent v.
Illinois Institute of Technology, 78 I11.App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779
(Kan. 1976); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980).
63. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr 722 (1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
64. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
65. See supra notes 21-37.
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gan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin have reviewed this. 66 Since 1980, limited statutory protection has been enacted in Michigan, Puerto Rico, and South
Dakota. 67 This indicates a beginning of serious legislative action to
follow firmly the path of many state judiciaries in modifying or abolish-

ing at-will employment. As more courts make inroads into this,
increased pressure will be placed upon legislatures to create statutory
solutions that specifically define employee and employer rights instead
of relying on fluctuating case law interpretations. The next ten years
will witness continued debate on this issue as inflation, unemployment,
and employee desires for increased job security remain of widespread
concern.
ABOLISHING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT THROUGH LEGISLATION

The power that an employer has over its employees is formidable.
When that employer is a large corporation it has virtually no limit.

66. See BARBASH, FEERICK & KAUFF, supra note 8, at 23, 65-79; BAKALY, JR. & FEERICK,
supra note 8, at 42.
67. BARBAS H, FEERICK & KAUFF, supra note 8, at 23, 65-79; M.C.L.A. §15.362 (1982);
LAWS OF PUERTO Rico tit. 29, §§185a, 185b (1982); South Dakota passed a just cause standard
specifically limited to contracts for employment at a stated annual salary, which under the
statute are deemed to be a hiring for one year and terminable only for just cause during the
initial year. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §60-1 to 60-4 (1982). In addition, in 1980, United States
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal introduced to the United States Congress "The Corporate
Democracy Act". It was an attempt at federal legislative relief for employees-at-will, which, if
passed, was to be incorporated into the National Labor Relations Act. H.R. REP. 7010, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 2490 (1980). Title IV of the bill provided in pertinent part:
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States to protect employees in the
security of their employment by ensuring that they are not deprived of such
employment on the basis of their having exercised their constitutional, civil, or other
legal rights, or because of their refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of
employment.
Id. §401(a)
The bill also provided that "[elmployees shall have the further right to be secure in their
employment from discharge or adverse action with respect to the terms or conditions of their
employment except for just cause." Id. §401(c). The bill defined just cause as follows:
The term "just cause" shall be defined in accordance with the common law of labor
contracts established pursuant to section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
except that such term shall not include (A) the exercise of constitutional, civil, or legal
rights; (B) the refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of employment;
(C) the refusal to submit to polygraph or other similar tests; or (D) the refusal to
submit to a search of someone's person or property, other than routine inspections,
conducted by an employer without legal process.
Id. at §401(b)(15).
At the end of the 96th Congress, with no formal action having been taken, the Corporate
Democracy Act died. See also Comment, The Employment-at- Will Rule, supra note 8 at
483-84, n.54.
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"Take-it-or-leave-it" is the name of the game. 68 It is not uncommon for
a recruiter in attracting the most qualified employees to say "if you
perform well, you will have a job for life." Similarly, a conscientious
employer attempting to further positive employee relations may include
in an employee handbook a grievance procedure and/or a statement
that termination will be for "just cause" only. Likewise, a personnel
manager, in making an employment offer, may quote a salary on a per
annum basis. These typical employer acts have been the norm for years.
It rarely was considered that these commonplace statements, representations, and policy enunciations might form the basis for employer
liability.
Today, there is a growing recognition that the at-will employee
should be similarly protected as most public employees and unionorganized employees are in the private and public sectors. It can no
longer be denied that this right goes back to the medieval Statute of
Labourers that imparted a "just cause" requirement in employee
terminations. 69
Job terminations are treated quite differently in other areas of the
industrial world. The International Labor Organization (ILO) recommended in 1963 that there should be a "valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker based on the
operational requirements [of the employer]." 70 This was again considered at the ILO International Labor Conference in Summer, 1982.71
The convention called for better protection for at-will employees.
Regretfully, the American government and its business delegates
adhered to their traditional "tunnel vision" approach on this question
and voted "No."72 Protection against wrongful terminations is afforded
by statute in all the Common Market countries, Sweden, Norway,
Japan, and Canada.73
The practice in Western Europe is to hear wrongful termination
claims before specialized labor courts or industrial tribunals. Typically,

68. See supra note 8.
69. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
70. Employer Discipline:LLO.Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 446, 449 (1964).
71. 110 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) "News and Background Information" 179 (July 5, 1982).
72. Id. The vote was 356 in favor, nine against, and 54 abstentions. The three United
States delegates were joined in voting "No" by delegates from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Brazil, and Chile. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government, employer, and labor
representatives all voted "yes." Id.
73. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee Report of the Committee
on Labor and Employment Law, At- Will Employment andthe Problem of Unjust Dismissal,36
RECORD Assw OFTHE BAR OFTHE CITY OF NEw YORK No. 4, §IIIC (April, 1981).
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these are tripartite. They are normally composed of a professional judge
74
or legally trained individual serving as chairman, along with laypersons.
It should be taken as a given that all employees are entitled to
protection against wrongful terminations. 75 However, should the courts
or the legislatures be the primary movers in abrogating at-will employment? Through the courts, a body of common law would result. Statutory solutions would involve selection of tribunals and procedures.
Overriding both would be the type of remedies to be granted. On one
hand, courts may be unwilling "to break through their self-created crust
of legal doctrine, 7 6 while legislation is often the product of organized
77
interest groups.
With the benefit of recent judicial decisions that limit at-will
employment, it is no longer impossible to foresee what will be imposed
by the judiciary. 78 Courts are likely to be long on generalization and
short on detail when it necessitates outlining procedures, remedies,
etc. 79 Even though legislatures may not wish to take the initiative for
understandable political reasons, they may be compelled to take action
by the boldness of some courts.80 At some point, employers may support legislation on the belief that the compromises and greater exactness of a statutory solution are preferable to the broad strokes and
blurred outlines often produced by an uninnovative judiciary. 81 Even
more important, nonunionized employers may perceive legislation as
the most important deterrent to unionization of their plants; i.e., the
union's argument of increased job protection from wrongful termina82
tion is minimized.
74. ST. ANTOINE, supra, note 8, at 35.
75. This view most recently has been prominently advanced by the distinguished
professor from the University of Michigan, Theodore J. St. Antoine. See ST. ANTOINE, supra,
note 8, at 35; 107 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) "News and Background Information" 911 (June I,
1981).
76. SUMMERS, IndividualProtection,supra, note 8, at 521.
77. PECK, supra note 8.
78. See supra notes 39-64.
79. ST. ANTOINE, supra, note 8 at 35.

80. Id.
81. This promise of a union bargaining greater job security cannot be underestimated. It
is one of the most important reasons why employees seek to organize. On the other hand,
organized labor may be a critical factor in securing legislative relief. It is the only interest group
that might be willing to take the lead in promoting such a cause. A common assumption,
however, is that unions will not favor legislation protecting employees against arbitrary
treatment by employers because it will undercut one of unions' prime selling points. This
possibility cannot be denied. Organized labor, however, could profit considerably from
refurbishing its image as the champion of the disadvantaged. More practically, a universal rule
against termination without cause actually could prove beneficial to unions in their organizing
drives by protecting union sympathizers. Id.
82. Id.
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The result may be that in a number of states the process of abrogating at-will employment will go through two stages. The first step that
may be considered as tentative will be taken by the courts. After this,
the legislatures will be compelled to provide a more definitive, logical,
and orderly fraLmework for resolution of these disputes.8 3 This is the
course that eVery state should follow. Courts are neither equipped to
handle the additional caseload nor sufficiently experienced in the area
of eiployee terminations. The judicial process is too long and procedurally cumbersome to provide adequate or swift remedies to the parties
involved.8 4 If the interests of employees and employers are to be adequately considered in abrogating at-will employment, new specialized
legislation will be necessary. The judiciary may be able to respond to
the extreme case and to the atypical situations of an employment ter-

mination. However, they have no capacity to construct an administrative mechanism for daily enforcement and their more formalized processes are not readily accessible to the average person.
Any statute should take the initial handling of these matters out of
the court's jurisdiction. Instead, all employee termination disputes
should be handled by arbitrators. The same court deference should be
given to their decisions as is done in other labor matters.8 5 Arbitration

would provide a proven, quick, inexpensive, and final resolution without overburdening the courts. 8 6 The statute should articulate a standard
for lawful termination or discipline in terms similar to "just cause. '87
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The grievance arbitration process has beeii described
as being:
at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means
of solving the unforeseeable by molding a systeh of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord
with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through
the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given
to the collective bargaining agreement ...The grievance procedure is, in other words,
a part of the continuotis collective bargaining process.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
86. See MENNEMEIER, supra note 8.
87. Most collective bargaining agreements in the private and public sectors do, in fact,
require "cause" or "just cause" for termination or other discipline. Where this is not contained in
a collective bargaining agreement many arbitrators imply a "just cause" limitation. For instance
Arbitrator Walter E. Boles held that "a just cause" basis for consideration of disciplinary action
is, absent a clear proviso to the contrary, implied in a modem collective bargaining agreement.
See Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 301 (1955). The reason is:
If the Company can discharge without cause, it can lay off without cause. It can recall,
transfer, or promote in violation of the seniority provisions simply by invoking its
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Certain employees should be excluded from the statute. Among these
are probationary employees and employees covered by a contract or
collective bargaining agreement providing for binding arbitration in the
event of a termination.
claimed right to discharge. Thus, to interpret the Agreement in accord with the claim
of the Company would reduce to a nullity the fundamental provison of a labbrmanagement agreement - the security of a worker in his job.
See Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747, 749 (1949).
The general significance of the terms "cause" or "just cause" were discussed by Arbitrator
Joseph D. McGoldrick as follows:
...[lit is common to include the right to suspend and discharge for "just cause,"
"justifiable cause," "proper cause," "obvious cause," or quite commonly simply for
"cause." There is no significant difference between these various phrases. These
exclude discharge for mere whim or caprice. They are, obviously, intended to include
those things for which employees have traditionally been fired. They include the
traditional causes of discharge in the particular trade or industry, the practices which
develop in the day-to-day relations of management and labor and most recently they
include the decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a growing body of
"common law" that may be regarded either as the latest development of the law of
"master and servant" or, perhaps, more properly as part of a new body of common law
of "Management and labor under collective bargaining agreements." They constitute
the duties owed by employees to management and, in their correlative aspect, are part
of the rights of management. They include such duties as honesty, punctuality, sobriety, or, conversely, the right to discharge for theft, repeated absence or lateness,
destruction of company property, brawling and the like. Where they are not expressed
in posted rules, they may very well be implied, provided they are applied in a uniform,
non-discriminatory manner.
Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955).
Absent precise definitions, "cause" or "just cause" may be considered any combinaiion of
the following factors:
(a) The "law of the shop" as to the particular offense; i.e., the response to that offense
developed over a period of years. Showing a consistent pattern of viewing that offense in a
certain manner, as requiring severe or less than severe discipline;
(b) A consistent pattern of enforcement of rules and regulations and of making known the
rules to all employees;
(c) Case histories of other incidents of enforcement;
(d) Known practices of severe discipline for certain offenses because of the product
manufactured or safety consideration;
(e) Offenses calling for immediate suspension and those not requiring removal;
(f)On-premises and off-premises offenses, and the differences in their treatment;
(g) General "arbitral authority," derived from publication of awards, articles, etc.;
(h) The arbitrator's own sense of equity and his/her subjective judgment as to the
significance, seriousness and weight to be given the incident involved, the record of the
employee, or the circumstances causing the termination;
(i) The severity of the case's facts;
(j) Attempts made to rehabilitate the employee by the employer;
(k) Progressive discipline steps that may or may not have been taken;
The discipline penalty imposed as it relates to the case's facts;
(1)
(in) Whether a "second chance" is warranted from the employee's prior record; or
(n) Whether the employee is unreclaimable as indicated by his/her prior recordi facts bf the
case; etc.
For a general discussion of "cause" and "just cause"see F. ELKOURI & E. A. ELKOURI, ibw
ARBITRATION WORKS 611-613 (3d ed. 1976).
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Instead of opposing legislation, the prudent employer should welcome a statutory scheme as providing an orderly legal remedy outside
of the courtroom. Unless this is done, the prospect of increased and
costly litigation is almost a certainty. Terminated emloyees can be
expected to litigate new fact situations concerning an employer's obligation to deal with employees fairly and in good faith.
Preventive employer planning can be important. More responsible
employee hiring, training, and termination procedures should be developed. In essence, abrogation of at-will employment may cause employers to make better employment decisions that may eventually effect
improved personnel policies. These policies should result in more efficient use of personnel if the employer conscientiously develops these
areas. At the same time, any legislation should create responsibilities
for both employees and employers in terminations. Employers should
be afforded protection for improper employee resignations that include
usurping corporate opportunities to work for a competitor or to compete against the employer.88 These general guidelines provide the
framework for legislation that will not undermine the employment relationship. It sets forth a speedy, just, inexpensive, and conclusive means
for resolving one of the most important disputes between employee and
employer.
STATUTORY PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT.

Statutory Proposal
Outlined below is a statutory proposal for regulating at-will
employment terminations within a state:
EMPLOYEE/EMPLOYER PROCEDURES FOR
TERMINATING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Section 1. Short Title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Act Regulating Employment Terminations."
Section 2. Definitions.
The following words and phrases, when used in this act, shall
have, unless clearly indicated otherwise, the meanings given to them
in this section:
"Appointing Authority." Either the State Bureau of Mediation
or the County Court, whichever is designated the responsibility
88. See Annot., Liabilityfor InducingEmployee Not EngagedforDefinite Term to Move
to Competitor,24 A.L.R.3d 821 (1969).
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through the filing of a complaint for appointing an arbitrator to
hear an employment termination.
"Bureau." The Bureau of Mediation of the Department of
Labor and Industry.
"County Court." The County Court in the county where the
termination of employment occurred.
"Employee." Any person who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration under a contract of hire that is written, oral,
express, or implied. Employee includes any person employed by an
individual, person, partnership, association, corporation, and the
. including any of its political subdiviState of
sions or any agency, authority, board, or commission created by
them. Employee does not include those: (a) covered by a collective
bargaining agreement that contains a final and binding grievance
arbitration procedure for the review of employment terminations;
(b) protected by a statutory civil service or tenure procedure;
(c) who have a written employment agreement that contains a final
and binding grievance arbitration procedure for the review of
employment terminations; or (d) that are in a probationary status.
"Employer." Any individual, person, partnership, association,
. including any of
corporation, and the State of
its political subdivisions or any agency, authority, board, or commission created by them.
"Persons." Any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership,
inassociation, corporation, and the State of
authority,
agency,
any
or
cluding any of its political subdivisions
board, or commission created by them.
_

"Probationary Status." A six month period of time that occurs
immediately after an employee is hired by an employer. It shall not
include, when an already employed employee is given a new
employment position, advancement, or promotion by his/her
employer.
"Termination of Employment." Any involuntary or voluntary
discontinuation of the employment relationship by an employee or
employer including but not limited to: terminations, discharges,
resignations, firings, layoffs that result from an improper action or
inaction of an employee or employer, etc.
Section 3.

Termination of Employment.

Termination of the employment relationship by an employee
or employer shall not occur unless there is a valid reason for the
termination that is not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory and
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relates to: (a) the ability or conduct of the employee; (b) the operational requirements of the employer; or (c) an employee's desire to
seek other employment or discontinue current employment.
Section 4.

Termination of Employment - Notice.

(a) Employee InitiatedTerminations.An employee who terminates the employment relationship on his/her own initiative shall
notify the employer orally of the intended termination at least
fifteen (15) calendar days prior to the effective date of termination
and shall before the date of termination provide the employer in
writing with the reasons for the termination either through delivery
in person or by certified mail return receipt requested.
(b) Employer Initiated Terminations.An employer who terminates the employment relationship shall notify the employee orally
at the time of the employment termination of the reasons therefor
and, thereafter, in writing by delivery in person or by certified mail,
return receipt requested, within ten (10) calendar days after the
employment termination, of all the reasons therefor.
Section 5.

Termination of Employment - Complaints.

An employee or employer who believes that a termination of
employment has occurred in violation of section 3 may file, by
certified mail, return receipt requested, a written request for arbitration of the dispute with either, but not both, the: (a) Bureau of
Mediation; or (b) the County Court in the county where the
termination of employment occurred at the county's Prothonotary's
Office. This written request must be mailed by certified mail, return
receipt requested, not later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the
employee's or the employer's written notification as is provided for
in Section 4. Where no written notification or an untimely written
notification is provided in accordance with Section 4, the employee
or employer must file this written request by certified mail, return
receipt requested, not later than ninety (90) days after the employee's last date of employment.
Section 6. Arbitration.
(a) Appointment. Where a written request for arbitration has
been filed with the Bureau of Mediation, the Bureau shall appoint
an arbitrator within forty-five (45) days after the request is received
from the panel of arbitrators maintained by the Bureau and shall
within this time period notify the employee and employer of the
appointment. In the event a written request for arbitration is filed
with the County Court in the county where the termination of
employment occurred, the Court on its own motion shall appoint an
arbitrator within forty-five (45) days after the request is received by
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the county's Prothonotary's Office from a list of attorneys it shall
maintain who it deems by experience, knowledge, and familiarity of
employment relations are qualified to hear these disputes on an
alternating basis.
(b) Hearing. Within thirty (30) calendar days after his/her
appointment, or within further additional periods of time as the
employee and employer may in writing agree, the arbitrator shall
schedule a hearing.
(c) Conduct of Hearing.The hearing shall be conducted in the
following manner:
(1) Fixing of Locale - The parties may miitually agree
upon the locale where the arbitration is to be held. If there is a
dispute as to the appropriate locale, the arbitrator shall have the
power to determine the locale and his/her decision shall be binding.
At least ten (10) days prior to the hearing, the arbitrator shall mail
notice of the time and place of the hearing, unless the parties
otherwise agree.
(2) Vacancies - If any arbitrator should resign, die,
withdraw, refuse, or be unable or disqualified to perform the duties
of his/her office, the Bureau or the County Court, whichever was
the original appointing authority, shall, on proof satisfactory tw it,
declare a vacancy. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as
the making of the original appointment, and the matter shall be
reheard by the new arbitrator.
(3) Representation of a Party - Any party may be
represented at the hearing by an attorney or by another representative of their choosing.
(4) Stenographic Record - Any party may request a
stenographic record by making their own arrangements. If the
parties agree that a transcript is to be the official record of the
proceeding, it must be made available to the arbitrator. The cost of
a record shall be paid for by those parties requesting one, in such
proportion as they may agree.
(5) Attendance at Hearing - Persons having a direct
interest in the arbitration are entitled to attend hearings. The
arbitrator shall have the power to require the retirement of any
witness or witnesses during the testimony of other witnesses. It shall
be discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the
attendance of any other persons.
(6) Adjournments - The arbitrator, for good cause shown,
the hearing upon the request of a party or upon
adjourn
may
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his/her own initiative, and shall adjourn when all the parties agree
thereto.
(7) Oaths - Before proceeding with the testimony, the
arbitrator may, in his/her discretion, or if requested by either party,
require witnesses to testify under oath administered by him/her.
(8) Arbitration in the Absence of a Party- The arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party, who after due notice,
acceptable to the arbitrator, fails to be present or fails to obtain an
adjournment.
(9) Evidence - The parties may offer evidence as they
desire and shall produce additional evidence as the arbitrator may
deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the
dispute. The arbitrator may subpoena witnesses and documents
upon his/her own initiative or upon the request of any party. The
arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevancy and materiality of the
evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not
be necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence of the
arbitrator and all of the parties, except where any of the parties is
absent, in default, or has waived his/her right to be present.
(10) Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of Documents The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses
by affidavit, but shall give it only such weight as he/she deems
proper after consideration of any objections made to its admission.
(11) Inspection - Whenever the arbitrator deems it necessary, he/she may make an inspection in connection with the subject
matter of the dispute.
(12) Closing of Hearings- The arbitrator shall inquire of
all parties whether they have any further proofs to offer or witnesses
to be heard. Upon receiving negative replies, the arbitrator shall
declare the hearings closed. If briefs or other documents are to be
filed, the hearings shall be declared closed as of the final date set by
the arbitrator for filing of these briefs. The time limit within which
the arbitrator is required to make his/her decision shall commence
to run, in the absence of other agreement by the parties, upon the
closing of hearings.
(13) Reopening of Hearings - The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator on his/her own motion, or on the motion
of either party, for good cause shown, at any time before the
decision is made.
(14) Time of Decision - The decision shall be rendered
promptly by the arbitrator and, unless otherwise agreed by the
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parties, not later than thirty (30) days from the date of closing the
hearings.
(15) Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings The arbitrator shall, upon the written request of a party, furnish to
the party at its expense certified facsimiles of any exhibits in the
arbitrator's possession that may be required in judicial proceedings
relating to the arbitration. Personal notes and working papers of the
arbitrator are exempt from disclosure.
(16) Judicial Proceedings - The arbitrator is not a
necessary party in any subsequent judicial proceedings relating to
the arbitration unless a court so requires.
(d) Decision. After the close of the hearing, the arbitrator,
based upon the issues presented, shall render a written opinion
outlining the reasons for the decision. The arbitrator shall sign and
date the decision. A copy of the decision shall be mailed to the
employee, employer, and the appointing authority by certified mail,
return receipt requested. Parties shall accept as legal delivery the
date the decision is received in the mail via certified mail, return
receipt requested, from the arbitrator, addressed to such party at its
last known address or to its attorney, or other representative
appearing at the hearing.
(e) Remedies. The remedies from which the arbitrator may
select include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Sustaining the termination of employment against the
employee or employer with or without a monetary award.
(2) Reinstating the employee with no, partial, or full back
pay.
(3) A severance payment.
(4) Adding a reasonable rate of interest to any monetary
award.
(5) Requiring restitution for any employee or employer
property.
(6) Attorney's fees or other fees for a party's representative.
(7) Any other remedy permitted under the law.
(f) Settlement. At any time after the appointment of the
arbitrator, the employee and employer may settle their dispute and
the terms of the settlement shall be set forth in an arbitrator's
decision.
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(g) Costs of Arbitration. The employee and employer shall
share equally the costs of the arbitration, but shall bear their own
costs for witnesses and the presenting of their respective position
unless otherwise decided by the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall set
his/her own fee for the hearing of the dispute.
Section 7. Effect of the Arbitrator'sDeciSion.
An arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding upon the
employee and employer and may be enforced in the County Cotitt
of the county in which the dispute arose.
Section 8.

JudicialReview.

The County Court of the county in which the dispute arose
shall review the arbitrator's decision, upon petition by either an
employee or employer filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the arbitrator's decision. This review shall be only for the reasons
that:
(a) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral, or corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudicing
the rights of any party;
(b) the arbitrator exceeded his/her powers; or
(d) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon good
cause being shown therefor, or refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
The pendency of a proceeding for review by the County Court, or
any further appeal to a State appellate court, shall not automatically
stay enforcement of the arbitrator's decision.
Section 9.

Contempt.

An employee or employer, who disobeys a lawful order for
enforcement of an arbitrator's award issued by any court of this
State, may be held in contempt. The punishment for each day that
the contempt occurs shall be a fine as set forth by the court,
imprisonment, or any other enforcement measure deemed appropriate.
Section 10.

Conflict With OtherActs.

Initiation of procedures pursuant to this act shall preclude an
employee or employer from instituting similar proceedings under
any other act. The remedies and procedures of this act shall be
exclusive and shall not be construed to duplicate any other act or be
in addition thereto.
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Section 11. Notice of this Act.
(a) PostingofAct. An employer shall post a copy of this act in
a prominent place of the work area.
(b) Copy of Act to Employee. Where the employer terminates
the employment relationship, a copy of this act shall be provided
along with the written notification provided for in section 4(b).
Section 12. Effective Date.
This act shall take effect 90 days after enactment and shall cover any
termination of employment that occurs on or after the effective date
of this act. This act shall not be retroactive.
Analysis of Statutory Proposal
In comparison with statutory schemes that have been suggested
within other jurisdictions 89 for the regulation of at-will employment, this
proposal is unique. Its scope is much broader than merely an attempt to
abrogate at-will employment. The proposal is an all-encompassing
attempt to set forth procedures for terminating the employment relationship by both employees and employers. In an effort to regulate this area,
employee and employer rights must be considered and balanced.
Employees must be protected from improper employment terminations
initiated by employers. Likewise, employers should be accorded an equal
recourse against improper employment terminations.
The proposal is intended to cover all employees and employers in
the public and private sectors. Only limited exclusions are provided for
employees: (1) covered by a collective bargaining agreemerit that contains a final and binding grievance arbitration procedure for the review
of employment terminations; (2) protected by a statutory civil service or
tenure procedure; (3) who have a written employment agreement that
contains a final and binding grievance arbitration procedure for the
review of employment terminations; or (4) who are in a probationary
status.
The standard to evaluate an improper termination by either an
employee or employer is simple; i.e., was there a valid reason for the
termination that is not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. This
standard is broad yet specific in that a "valid reason" for the termination
must exist.
Notice of an employment termination is required by both employees and employers. This must be given orally and in writing. A cause
of action for an improper termination occurs from, the date the written
89.

See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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notice is received by certified mail return receipt requested. Where no
notice is given nor timely received, the period for filing a complaint is
increased. This is done to encourage the giving of written notice. Otherwise, potential backpay liability is extended.
The initiation of the complaint is simple. Only a request for arbitration need be filed. One of two methods for appointing an arbitrator may
be selected. This may occur through the services of the State's Bureau of
Mediation of the Department of Labor and Industry, or through the
local County Court in the county where the improper employment termination occurred.
The proposal places no additional burden on the Bureau of Mediation that is significant for the administration of this act. In most cases,
they already have available lists of arbitrators they consider competent
to handle these disputes. The only duty of the Bureau is to appoint an
arbitrator. An employee and employer are given no discretion in the
selection of the arbitrator. This is solely the responsibility of the Bureau
of Mediation.
An additional, yet not overburdensome, requirement is placed on
the County Court. It must develop a list of attorneys it feels are qualified
to serve as arbitrators. 90 These individuals should have the experience,
knowledge, and familiarity to deal with employment relations. 9g This is
an effort to develop a pool of individuals who may be called upon later
to serve as labor arbitrators for other disputes.
The arbitration is to be conducted like any other labor arbitration.
An arbitrator's award is to be considered final and binding on the parties. It can be set aside only through the same standards that apply to the
review of any arbitration award. Failure to conform with an arbitration
award carries a severe contempt penalty.

90. For example, in Pennsylvania, court appointed arbitrators are already used to hear
and decide civil cases. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §7361 (Purdon's 1982). This pool of arbitrators
may provide the training ground for what eventually could become a labor court. See infra note
91.
91. An even bolder approach would be to establish a separate system of labor courts
within a state to deal with any labor-related problem. This suggestion has been previously
advanced by other commentators for use within the United States. See Jones & Smith,
Management and Labor Appraisalsand Criticisms of the ArbitrationProcess:A Report with
Comments, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1122 and n. 11 (1964). A system of specialized labor courts
has been successful in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. These courts could be operated with a
simplified procedure like that used in small claims courts. In this way, cases could be readily
presented by personnel managers, union representatives, or other laypersons without the
necessity of being represented by attorneys. In simple cases, the use of attorneys may only
obfuscate and complicate what is readily apparent. These courts also would be equipped to hear
complex cases to give full scope to representation by legal counsel. See P. HAYES, LABOR
ARBITRATION - A DISSENTING VIEW 116-118 (1966).
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To discourage the appeal of other than the most legitimate cases, no
automatic stay to enforcement is provided. This lends further to the
finality and binding quality of any arbitrator's decision. If a stay is to be
granted, it is assumed that a party must demonstrate some likelihood of
success on appeal or extreme prejudice.
This procedure is not intended to duplicate any other remedies that
are available for improper employment terminations. Notice of the act
must be given to all employees and employers. Finally, the effective date
of the act is postponed for 90 days. This is done for the purpose of
allowing employees and employers to prepare for the act's implementation.
This proposal is an effort to provide a quick, efficient, and economical means for resolving employment termination disputes between
employees and employers without unduly placing an extra strain on the
courts. It cannot be denied that, as this area of the law continues to
develop during the next ten years, legislatures will be called upon
increasingly to regulate this area by both employees and employers. The
proposal is intended to be a beginning point for immediately addressing
the needs of both employees and employers in the termination of any
employment relationship.
PERSONNEL POLICIES TO AvoID AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION.

No employer is desirous of engaging in litigation if it can avoid it.
This is particularly true of suits brought by former employees charging
wrongful termination. Even when an employer prevails, it may suffer
damage from poor publicity. Because courts and legislatures are altering
at-will employment, many employers may be left unprepared. Termination practices that once were acceptable may suddenly no longer be
adequate.
Lawsuits, whether justified or not, generate poor public relations
for employers. Consequently, many employers settle out of court to
avoid negative publicity. Realizing this, more and more attorneys are
ready to pursue at-will employment cases on a contingency basis because
the likelihood of monetary settlement has increased.
It is only human nature for an employee to classify a termination as
unjust. Regardless of how just or unjust terminations are, they often
cause deep-seated emotional problems. Because of this, the desire to sue
for damages is not surprising. In view of the growing evidence of judicial
and legislative sympathy for terminated employees, litigation surely will
increase during the 1980's.
Despite this, employers can lessen their exposure to involvement in
these cases. The following suggestions may aid in minimizing any
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employer liability:
1. Put in writing whatever the grounds may be for termination and
circulate this information to all employees. This may protect against
charges of termination without-proper warning.
2. Document every termination action. Keep precise records of
conferences, warnings, probationaiy notices, remedial efforts, and other
steps that precede termination.
3. Refine performance evaluations to give honest appraisals of each
employee's weak and strong points. The courts are especially sympathetic to documented evidence that a terminated employee had previously received favorable annual assessments.
4. Give advance warning that an employee has taken a course
possibly leading to termination unless changes occur in his/her performance. Put these notices in writing, or have witnesses present at oral
admonitions.
5. Watch for signs of an employee's work problems. Job-related
stress or discontent over working conditions may turn a once satisfactory performer into a termination possibility. Signs include a drop in
productivity, a tendency to slow down on the job, and an increase in the
number of complaints. Try to reclaim such an employee, before termination becomes necessary.
6. Involve two or more persons in the termination process. This
practice can minimize suits that allege malice or personality conflicts
between a terminated employee and supervisor.
7. Review severance-pay policies. If a terminated employee considers a severance payment fair, he/she may be less likely to initiate litigation. Any extra money expended usually amounts to only a fraction of
what a court might award.
8. Develop a severance package that includes continuance, 'for a
limited time, of health and life insurance benefits. Such courtesies may
preclude any charges of vindictiveness and may help to mollify any
injured feelings.
9. Terminate only when you must, with care and compassion. In
general, an exit interview should be conducted away from other
employees to avoid embarrassment. The reason(s) for termination
should be explained clearly and the nature of any reference to be given
should be described.
10. Consider buying "defense and judgment" insurance. This relatively new form of coverage protects employers against lawsuits arising
from cases other than personal-injury or property-damages suits covered
under conventional insurance policies.
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Remember, an employer should be able to document that a termination was for "cause" if lawsuits are to be prevented, unemployment
compensation claims are to be contested, union challenges are to be
defended, or discrimination charges are to be successfully litigated. In
addition to keeping written records, an employer should follow clearcut, well-publicized procedures for all disciplinary actions.
Proper attention to an employee's problem, or the employer's problems with -him/her, may save the employee's position and save the
employer future trouble and expense. If the cause of an employee's
problem is personal, counseling is sometimes the answer; if the problem
is vocational, a transfer or retraining may help. It pays to postpone a
termination until all other possibilities have been examined. But if termination is unavoidable, the employer should proceed slowly and carefully; everyone will benefit in the end.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing examination of at-will employment and its abrogation through legislative means has not purported to offer the only, or
necessarily the preferable, method of dealing with this increasingly
important question. However, it is believed that statutory regulation
realistically offers the most concrete manner in which to confront this
matter. The need for immediate and thoughtful study in this area is clear.
Until the impact or viability of regulating employment terminations
through statute is assessed, courts will continue to develop a common
law that encourages overburdening the judicial system by failing to set
forth specific guidelines. This will be costly for employees, employers,
and an already overtaxed judicial system.
The time is now for all interested parties to begin a thoughtful and
realistic examination of this developing area. No longer can employers
ignore the impact of these disputes. Courts have already set forth sufficient warning signals for the initiation of legislative action.
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